In each of the state health insurance marketplaces established by the Affordable Care Act (ACA), there is a set number of geographic "rating areas" that all insurers participating in the state's marketplace must uniformly use in their price setting. The ACA mandates that, conditional on insurees' age, smoking status, and family composition, a health insurance plan be uniformly priced in all counties that belong to the same rating area. However, the ACA does not require that a plan be sold in all counties of a rating area. This paper documents the prevalence of a phenomenon, which we refer to as partial rating area offering, where plans are only sold to a strict subset of counties within a rating area. Using the universe of individual health insurance plans sold in 34 states with federally-facilitated marketplaces in year 2016, we find that about a third of the plans are sold to some, but not all, counties within a rating area. We hypothesize two explanations for this phenomenon: (1) insurers may selectively offer plans to risk screen consumers; or (2) insurers may use partial rating area offering as a way to lessen competition. We propose a theoretical model to illustrate, as well as a novel empirical test to distinguish, these two hypotheses. Our findings suggest that partial rating area offering is better explained by the risk screening hypothesis.
Introduction
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) established state-by-state health insurance marketplaces (also known as "exchanges") which came into full operation in October 2013. From the marketplaces, individuals can purchase health insurance plans that are subject to numerous regulations outlined by the ACA. One of the most notable regulations is that in each state marketplace, insurers are allowed to vary premiums for the same policy based only on insurees' age, smoking status, family composition, and geographic location known as "rating area". The main idea behind rating areas is that premiums should be adjusted to reflect regional differences in health care costs. Each state has a set number of geographic rating areas that all insurers participating in the state's marketplace must uniformly use in their price setting. The division of each state's rating areas was approved by the federal government before the opening of the marketplaces, and in most states, a rating area is composed of counties. This paper starts from the observation that while the ACA mandates a marketplace plan be uniformly priced in all counties that belong to the same rating area, it does not require that the plan be sold in all counties within the rating area. Plans that partially cover a county are almost never approved by the federal government, but there is no regulation for plans that partially cover a rating area.
We investigate, for the first time to our best knowledge, whether insurers sell plans that cover only a strict subset of counties of a rating area, and if so, what drives such "partial rating area offering" decisions. If insurers in the marketplaces issue plans that are sold in some, but not all, counties of a rating area, it suggests that insurers are effectively varying premiums by county, and the government has imperfect control over insurers' ability to vary premiums by geographic region. Furthermore, as different insurer motives call for different policy remedies, it is crucial to understand why insurers sell plans that cover only a fraction of the counties in a rating area. For example, if insurers are using partial rating area offering to divide up a rating area with their competitors and avoid head-on competition, then a direct regulation on plans' service area could be efficient. On the other hand, if insurers are not offering plans in high-risk counties where it is almost impossible to avoid a loss, then mandating all plans be offered in all counties of a rating area could trigger insurer exits. In this case, a different policy intervention should be considered such as providing subsidies that are tied to the risk score of counties.
We start by assessing how prevalently marketplace plans are sold to a strict subset of counties in a rating area. Our main data come from the 2016 Marketplace Public Use Files collected by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. The dataset has the universe of individual health insurance plans sold in 34 states that receive support from the federal government, i.e., Department of Health and Humans Services, for the marketplace operations. Based on various statistics developed in this paper, we find that partial rating area offering is quite common in the marketplaces: (1) a third of the marketplace plans in our sample are partially offered to some, but not all, counties of a rating area and (2) about 30% of the insurance companies exclude at least one county from their service area while selling plans to other counties in the same rating area.
We hypothesize two potential explanations for this partial rating area offering phenomenon based on descriptive patterns found in our data. First, insurers may selectively offer plans to risk screen consumers. We call this the risk screening hypothesis. This hypothesis is motivated by the empirical pattern that counties of smaller population and higher risks tend to get excluded from insurers' service area. Second, insurers may use partial rating area offering as a way to avoid competition and divide up a rating area with their competitors. We call this the market segmentation hypothesis. It has been noted that the number of consumers with just one marketplace insurer to choose from has increased from 2016 to 2017. 1 While it may be due to high profile insurer exits from the marketplaces, it may also be due to insurers' increased ability to segment rating areas with competitors. Testing the empirical relevance of the market segmentation hypothesis could therefore generate useful insights about insurers' county entry decisions.
To formalize our hypotheses, we develop a simple model of insurer competition within a rating area that consists of multiple counties. Each insurer decides which counties to enter, and how to price their plans. If an insurer sells a plan to multiple counties, then its price has to be the same for all of serviced counties, as required by the ACA. Insurer competition in a county takes a form of Bertrand competition with a spurious product differentiation. As counties differ in their risk distributions, insurers have an incentive to offer county-specific plans to better risk screen consumers. At the same time, they have a disincentive to enter counties that belong to competitors' service area because premium competition would lower profit margins. In equilibrium, insurers' entry and pricing decisions are best responses to those of competitors. We parametrize the model, and numerically compute the equilibrium for a wide range of parameter values. We find that, under a large set of parameter values, insurers pool to offering county-specific plans in equilibrium. The result therefore suggests that partial rating area offering is better explained by the risk screening hypothesis than the market segmentation hypothesis. This is because in our static model, insurers' incentive to deviate from market segmentation and enter competitors' counties dominates.
From the model, we derive testable implications for the risk screening and market segmentation hypotheses. Under the risk screening hypothesis, insurers' plan offering decisions would be positively correlated across counties in a rating area, while under the market segmentation hypothesis, they would be negatively correlated. This is because if one insurer were offering different plans in different counties to better risk screen consumers, then other insurers would face the same risk screening incentive. So if partial rating area offering is primarily driven by insurers' incentive to risk screen consumers, then we should observe a positive correlation among insurers' plan offering decisions across counties within a rating area. In contrast, if insurers were restricting their service area to avoid head-on competition, then insurers' plan offering decisions would be negatively correlated. This is because insurers would avoid entering a county where its competitors are present.
To test the implications, we develop a non-parametric correlation measure which captures the average alignment of insurers' county entry decisions in a given rating area. We compute the cor-relations for each of the rating areas in our sample, and find that among 135 rating areas with some partial offering, 121 rating areas (about 90%) have strictly positive correlations between insurers' plan offering decisions. We then use the correlation measure to test a null hypothesis of independence across insurers' county entry decisions. We derive asymptotic properties of the test statistic and show that we can reject the null hypothesis of independence in favor of the risk screening hypothesis at a very small significance level. This result is consistent with the model's prediction, and provides empirical support for the risk screening and against the market segmentation hypotheses.
Next, we conduct a regression analysis to compute the correlation among insurers' plan offering decisions conditional on various dimensions of heterogeneity, such as plan characteristics and provider networks. Controlling for plans' provider networks is particularly important, because insurers may not offer plans in counties where they have a relatively narrow network of health care providers. From the regression analysis, we again find a significant and positive correlation among insurers' plan offering decisions. This set of results implies that while the ACA regulation only allows geographic risk adjustments based on rating areas, insurers are effectively risk screening consumers based on counties (smaller geographic units compared to rating areas) by endogenously determining their service area within a rating area.
Finally, we apply our non-parametric correlation test to the 2017 marketplace data. The purpose is to analyze whether there was a meaningful change in the correlations among insurers' county entry decisions from 2016 to 2017. We find that while positive correlations are still more likely to be observed than negative correlations, the share of rating areas with positive correlations has decreased from 90% to 62%. The test statistic is lower accordingly, but we are still able to reject the null hypothesis of independence in favor of positive correlations at a very small significance level. This result suggests that while the risk screening incentive is still the dominant factor in insurers' county entry decisions, the market segmentation incentive is becoming stronger.
Our work relates to papers that study the design of the health insurance exchanges. Many papers in this literature use data from the Massachusetts health insurance exchange, which was established in 2006 and have regulation settings similar to the ACA marketplaces, such as age-based pricing (Ericson and Starc, 2015) , individual mandate (Hackmann et al., 2015) , and subsidies (Finkelstein et al., 2017; Jaffe and Shepard, 2017) . Recent work by Dafny et al. (2017) and Polsky et al. (2016) use ACA marketplace data to examine the prevalence of narrow provider networks and their potentials for lowering premiums. 2 Our contributions lie in documenting the prevalence of partial rating area plans and studying firms' entry/exit responses to geographic community ratings.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe the data and provide summary statistics. In Section 3, we demonstrate the prevalence of partial rating area coverage using several measures of marketing breadth. In Section 4, we present our model of insurer com-petition. In Section 5, we empirically test our hypotheses and discuss the results. Finally, in Section 6, we conclude.
Background and Data
In this section, we provide a brief background on the ACA marketplaces, describe our data sources, and present summary statistics.
ACA Marketplaces and Rating Areas
Before the ACA, individual health insurance sold in most states was medically written; insurers could deny coverage or charge a higher premium based on many factors including health status and medical history. 3 The ACA aims to limit such rating practices, and mandates that in each state marketplace, premiums be adjusted only for an individual's age, tobacco use, family composition, and geographic location. Each state has a set number of geographic rating areas that all insurers participating in the state's marketplace must uniformly use in their price setting. The default geographic rating areas for each state was the Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) plus the remainder of the state that is not included in a MSA. However, states were given a chance to seek approval from the federal government, the Department of Health and Humans Services (HHS), for a different division method, provided that the division method was based on counties, three-digit zip codes, or MSAs/non-MSAs, and states demonstrated how the new division method would (1) reflect significant differences in health care costs by rating area, (2) lead to stability in rates over time, (3) apply uniformly to all insurers in a market, and (4) (Alabama, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, Virginia, and Wyoming) have the federal default MSAs+1. Six states (Delaware, Hawaii, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Vermont) and District of Columbia have a single rating area, meaning that there is no premium adjustment for geographic location within the state. On the other extreme, states like Florida and South Carolina have single-county rating areas, meaning that premiums vary by county within the state. All states and District of Columbia, excluding the five states that use zipcodes to define rating areas (Alaska, California, Idaho, Massachusetts, and Nebraska ) , have rating 6 areas composed of a single or multiple counties. The total number of rating areas from these states and District of Columbia is 459. Out of these 459 rating areas, 161 are single-county rating areas, while the remaining 298 rating areas are composed of multiple counties. Our focus is on these rating areas with multiple counties. Insurers in a rating area with multiple counties must charge the same premium to all individuals residing in counties where they choose to sell their plans. This is because while the ACA mandates that premiums be the same for all residents of a rating area, it does not mandate that insurers sell plans to residents of all counties within the rating area. The goal of this paper is to study how insurers respond to this particular feature of the ACA when they make county entry decisions in a rating area with multiple counties. 5
Marketplace Public Use Files
Our main data come from the 2016 Marketplace Public Use Files (PUF) provided by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) . The Marketplace PUF covers 38 states participating in federally-facilitated marketplaces; the last column in Table 1 indicates whether each state has a federally-facilitated marketplace. 6 The Marketplace PUF provides information on plan characteristics including benefits, copayments, premiums, and the set of counties where a plan is sold, which is referred to as the plan's service area. In Section 3, we use this service area information to assess how prevalently plans are sold to a strict subset of counties in a rating area.
There are 4,125 individual health plans offered in 38 federally-facilitated marketplaces in year 2016. We impose the following set of restrictions on the data. First, we exclude two states, Alaska and Nebraska, that use zip codes, rather than counties, to define rating areas. This is because our unit of analysis is at the county level. Imposing this restriction leaves us with 4,059 plans offered by 235 insurers in 36 states and 405 rating areas. Second, we only keep plan-rating area combinations for which we have both service area and premium information. This restriction reduces the number of plan-rating area combinations from 20,569 to 19,991. Table 2 summarizes our sample after imposing this restriction. Lastly, we exclude rating areas that consist of a single county because in such rating areas, there can be no partial rating area offering by definition. Out of 405 rating areas, 146 have just one county, and we exclude them from the sample. Imposing this restriction excludes all plans from Florida and South Carolina as their rating areas always consist of a single county. Table 3 reports the summary statistics of the final Marketplace PUF. We have 3,442 individual health plans offered by 214 insurers in 34 states. The number of non single county rating areas is 259, and we have a total of 2,335 counties and 13,029 plan-rating area combinations. Table 4 reports the average characteristics of the plans in our final Marketplace PUF sample by their metal 5 We focus on insurers' entry decisions at the county level because, as previously mentioned, the federal government almost never approves plans that are not sold to all residents of a county. 6 The degree to which states rely on the HHS varies; 27 states have marketplaces that are entirely operated by the HHS, 7 states perform in-person consumer assistance while delegating all other functions to the HHS, and 4 states are responsible for performing their own marketplace functions, except that they rely on the federal IT platform. In this paper, we refer to the 38 states that rely on the HHS for any support as having federally-facilitated marketplaces. class. Metal classes are determined by the actuarial value of a plan, and it increases from Catastrophic, Bronze, Silver, Gold, to Platinum. Most of the plans are either Silver or Bronze, followed by Gold plans. Catastrophic plans have the highest maximum out of pocket expenditures and deductibles, followed by Bronze, Silver, Gold and Platinum plans. The average premium is the lowest for Catastrophic plans, and rises with metal levels. For a given plan, the average premium increases with enrollees' age.
Provider Network Data
One of the key plan characteristics that is not found in the Marketplace PUF is information about provider networks. A provider network is a list of doctors and hospitals that a plan has contracted with to provide medical care at lower costs. Different types of plans put different restrictions on consumers' provider choice outside plans' networks. Exclusive Provider Organization (EPO) and Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) plans do not cover providers outside their networks, while Point of Service (POS) and Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) plans cover out-of-network providers for an additional cost. 7 Table 5 shows the share of each plan type for our final Marketplace PUF sample described in Table 3 . HMOs have the largest share of 52%, followed by PPO, POS, and EPO.
Starting with 2016 plans, insurers participating in federally-facilitated marketplaces are required to submit URLs where they upload plan network information such as covered providers' NPIs, names, addresses, specialties and gender. We use the submitted URLs as of October 2015 to obtain provider data. While the submission was mandatory, as of October 2015, no insurer operating in Hawaii, New Mexico, Nevada, and Oregon submitted the required URLs. Out of 235 insurers offering individual health plans in federally-facilitated marketplaces other than Alaska and Nebraska, 214 insurers submitted a URL and 204 insurers had a working URL. We manually downloaded provider information from each of the working URLs.
There are several accuracy problems detected in the downloaded provider data such as missing NPIs and highly inaccurate address information. 8 We use the SK&A data to deal with such issues. 9 The SK&A data provide information on 556,882 physicians identified by their NPIs. 10 From the downloaded provider data, we only keep physicians with NPIs who can be found in the SK&A data. We use address information listed in the SK&A data for accuracy. In the end, we have provider data on 395 individual health plan networks offered by 204 insurers in 32 federallyfacilitated states, excluding four states where no provider data were available, and two states that use zip codes for the rating area division. The provider data consist of 421,113 physicians with NPIs and 566,462 NPI-address observations. Table 6 reports the summary statistics of the provider data. There are 3,590 plans issued by 204 insurers, and each plan uses one of the 395 provider networks; these plans are sold in 32 states, covering 388 rating areas, and 2,318 counties. Of the 388 rating areas, 246 have multiple counties. There is a total of 18,316 plan-rating area combinations. Table 7 reports the summary statistics after excluding single county rating areas. It includes 3,000 plans issued by 183 insurers, and each plan 8 A National Provider Identifier (NPI) is a unique identification number issued to health care providers by the CMS. 9 We are very grateful to Daniel Polsky and his research team for sharing the SK&A data with us. 10 As many physicians practice in multiple locations, SK&A data have 775,978 NPI-address observations. 9 Counties Plan-RA  3,590  204  395  32  388  246  2,318 18,316 uses one of 353 provider networks. These plans are sold in 30 states, covering a total of 246 rating areas and 2,176 counties. There are 11,648 plan-rating area combinations.
Plans Insurers Networks States RAs Non Single County RAs
To assess how broad or narrow the provider networks are in our data, we develop two network breadth measures: 11 Network-County Level Measure. In the first measure, we assess how broad a network is in a county where the network is offered. 12 We divide the total number of physicians in the county who are in the network by the total number of physicians in the county. We use the SK&A data to compute the total number of physicians for each county. The total number of network breadths we calculate for this measure is equal to the number of unique network-county combinations, which is 10,530.
Network Level Measure. In the second measure, we assess how broad a network is in the union of counties where the network is offered. We divide the total number of physicians in the union of covered counties who are in the network by the total number of physicians in the union of covered counties. The total number of network breadths we calculate for this measure is equal to the number of unique provider networks, which is 395. Table 8 shows the summary statistics of the network breadth defined using the first measure. Following Polsky and Weiner (2015), we categorize network breadth into five groups; XS if the breadth is less than 10%, S if between 10-25%, M if 25-40%, L if 40-60%, and XL if bigger than 60%. Table 8 reveals that on average, a network covers 57% of physicians in a county where it is offered. More than half the time, a network in a given county is XL while it is XS for 12% of the time. Figure  1 shows the histogram of the network size defined using the first measure. Table 9 shows the 11 For this exercise, we use 395 networks as reported in Table 6 and include rating areas that consist of a single county. 12 A network is offered in a county if there is at least one plan sold in the county that is associated with that network. Notes: For each network and for each county where the network is offered, we compute the network breadth as the fraction of physicians in the county who are in the network. Observations are at the network-county level. Mean represents the average network breadth of observations. We categorize observations based on the network breadth (see text for details) and the table reports the share of observations for each category.
summary statistics of the network breadth defined using the second measure and Figure 2 shows its histogram. On average, a network covers 45% of physicians in the union of covered counties, and about 30% of the networks are XL while 20% are either XS or S.
Observations Mean XS (< 0.10%) S (10-25%) M (25-40%) L (40-60%) XL (> 60%) 395 0.45 0.08 0.12 0.24 0.25 0.31 
County Data
To obtain information about counties, we use the Area Health Resources Files (AHRF) provided by the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (CHR) . The AHRF and CHR provide county level data on various health and socioeconomic characteristics.
Prevalence of Partial Rating Area Offering
In this section, we assess how prevalently marketplace plans are sold to a strict subset of counties in their rating areas. To this end, we develop various statistics to measure plans' and insurers' marketing breadth within a rating area. To make our measures easier to understand, we introduce the following mnemonic notations. We index health insurance plans by p = 1, ..., P ; rating areas by r = 1, ..., R; counties by c = 1, ..., C; and insurers by i = 1, ..., I. For each plan p = 1, ..., P, I P (p) ∈ {1, ..., I} denotes the insurer who offers plan p. C (r) denotes the set of counties in rating area r. From the Marketplace PUF, we can construct the following variable:
Using these notations, we can now construct several auxiliary objects of interest which are described in Table 10 . 13 In what follows, we use these objects to define various measures of marketing Notations Descriptions Set of Health Insurance Plans P I (i) = {p : I P (p) = i} . Set of plans offered by insurer i.
Set of plans offered in county c.
Set of plans offered in rating area r.
Set of Insurers
Set of rating areas in which plan p is offered. breadth.
Measuring Marketing Breadth Using Plan Coverage
To assess whether plans are partially or universally offered in a rating area, we develop a set of three measures that are based on plans' service area.
First, for each plan and for each of the rating areas (RA) where the plan is offered, we define plan-RA level marketing breadth as the fraction of counties in the rating area where the plan is offered.
This measure tells us how broadly a plan covers a rating area. This measure can be represented as follows: for every r ∈ {1, ..., R} , and every p ∈ P R (r) ,
where the denominator is the number of counties in rating area r, and the numerator is the number of counties in rating area r where plan p is offered. For example, if plan p is offered in every county in rating area r, then C P (p)∩C (r) = C (r), resulting in B P 1 (p, r) = 1, i.e., plan p's marketing breadth in rating area r is 1. If plan p is only offered in one of the three counties that form rating area r,
Second, we develop a county level measure to evaluate how completely a county is served by plans that are offered in the county's rating area. Specifically, for each county, we compute the fraction of plans offered in its rating area that are also offered in the county:
where the denominator is the number of plans that are offered in the rating area to which county c belongs, and the numerator is the number of plans offered in county c. are offered in the rating area to which county c belongs, but only two of the five plans are offered in county c, then B P 2 (c) = 2 5 .
Lastly, we develop a rating area level measure to quantify how broadly plans serve counties in a rating area. This measure can be computed either by taking the average of the first plan-RA level measure, or by taking the average of the second county level measure. Both methods yield the same result: 14
. Table 11 reports the summary statistics of the three measures for the Marketplace PUF described in Table 3 . From the first measure B P 1 (p, r) , we see that 33% of the 13,029 plan-RA combinations have coverage breadth less than one. This means that one third of the plans are not offered to all counties in the rating area where they are offered. On average, a plan is offered to 81% of counties in a rating area, with a standard deviation of 30%. From the second measure B P 2 (c), we find that, of the 2,335 counties located in rating areas that consist of multiple counties, 57% are excluded by at least one plan offered in their respective rating area. On average, a county is served by 79% of plans in its rating area, with a standard deviation of 25%. From the third measure B P 3 (r) , we find that, of the 259 rating areas with multiple counties, about 63% have at least one plan that is not universally offered across counties. On average, rating areas have plan coverage rate of 87%.
14 To see this, note that, for rating area r,
As |C P (p) ∩ C (r)| represents the total number of counties in rating area r where plan p is sold, p∈P R (r) |C P (p) ∩ C (r)| represents the total number of plan-county combinations in rating area r. An alternative expression for the total number of plan-county combinations in rating area r is c∈C(r) |P C (c)| .
Measuring Marketing Breadth Using Insurer Coverage
While the previous measures are informative of the marketing breadth at the plan level, they ignore the fact that insurers may offer multiple plans in a rating area. For example, suppose insurers offer different plans to each and every county in a rating area. In this case, insurers are selling plans in all counties within a rating area, and no county is left out by any insurer. However, the previous measures would imply that the marketing breadth is very narrow, and they would not capture the fact that the marketing breadth is actually comprehensive at the insurer level. To mitigate these potential issues, we also use insurer coverage to define three analogous measures of marketing breadth.
First, we develop a insurer-RA level measure to assess how comprehensively an insurer serves a rating area. For every insurer i and for every rating area r where the insurer is active, we compute the share of counties where the insurer offers at least one plan:
where the denominator is the number of counties in rating area r and the numerator is the number of counties in rating area r that insurer i offers at least one plan. For example, if insurer i offers at least one plan in every county in rating area r, then B I 1 (i, r) = 1. In contrast, if insurer i only offers plans in one of the three counties that form rating area r, then B I 1 (i, r) = 1 3 .
Second, we develop a county level measure to evaluate how comprehensively a county is served by insurers active in its rating area. For every county c, we compute the fraction of active insurers in its rating area that sell at least one plan in the county:
where the denominator is the number of active insurers in rating area r to which county c belongs, and the numerator is the number of active insurers in county c. 15
Third, we develop a rating area level measure to quantify how comprehensively insurers serve counties in a rating area. To do this, we compute the average of the first measure, B I 1 (i, r), or the second measure, B I 2 (c), both of which yield the same result:
Table 12 reports the summary statistics of the above three measures that are based on insurer 15 The definitions for sets I C and I R are provided in coverage. The sample is again restricted to the final Marketplace PUF as described in Table 3 . Using the first measure B I 1 (i, r) , we find that in 29% of the 1,236 instances where an insurer is active in a rating area, the insurer does not offer a plan in all counties in the rating area, resulting in an insurer-RA breadth measure that is less than one. On average, an insurer offers plans in 85% of the counties in a rating area where it is active. Indeed, we find that out of the 214 insurers in our sample, 116 insurers (about 54%) engage in partial rating area marketing by not offering any plans to at least one county in a rating area where they are active. From the second measure B I 2 (c) , we find that 41% of the 2,335 counties in our sample are excluded by at least one insurer who is active in their rating areas. On average, a county is excluded by 17% of active insurers in its rating area. Finally, using the third measure B I 3 (r) , we find that 52% of the 259 rating areas with multiple counties have some active insurers who do not operate in all of their counties. On average, a rating area has an insurer participation rate of 89%.
Descriptive Patterns
The measures developed above show that a large fraction of insurers are selectively entering counties, and selectively offering plans within a rating area. To better understand motives behind such partial offering decisions, we examine descriptive patterns between plan offering decisions and various factors such as county, plan, and provider network characteristics.
To examine how insurers' plan offering decisions are correlated with county characteristics, we categorize counties based on B P 2 (c), the plan participation rate in a county. We consider five groups of counties: Table 13 shows the average county characteristics for each county group as defined above. Counties with lower plan participation rates tend to be much less populated and have fewer health care providers. They also have higher uninsured rates, fewer people with college education, and higher per capita Medicare spending. biggest share. Premiums tend to be smaller in counties with lower plan participation rates across all metal classes.
We can also distinguish rating areas by whether they have some plans that are partially offered, i.e., B P 3 (r) < 1, and compare the average characteristics between the two groups of rating areas. As reported in Table 11 , 162 out of 259 rating areas (representing about 63%) have some plans that are partially offered, while the remaining 97 rating areas do not have such plans. Table 15 compares the average county characteristics of rating areas without any partial entry (Column 1) to those of rating areas with some partial entry (Column 2). Rating areas with partial entry tend to have greater heterogeneity among their counties; they have counties that vary more in their population, number of health care providers, household income, and per capital Medicare spending.
Finally, we examine how plan offering decisions are related to provider network breadth. For each plan p, and for each county c that belongs to one of the plan's active rating areas, R P (p), we compute the plan's network breadth as the share of doctors in the county that participate in the plan's network. Then, we examine how a plan's network size in a county is related to the plan's offering in that county. Figure 3 presents the relationship. It reports, for each quantile of plans' network breadth in a county, the share of plans that are offered. There is a very strong positive relationship; while the offer probability is less than 30% in the bottom quintile of the network breadth distribution, the offer probability is close to 95% at the top quintile. (c) , the plan participation rate (see the text for details). The first five rows report the share of each metal class. The remaining rows report the mean and standard deviation of premiums (standard deviation is reported in parentheses). Premiums represent the average monthly rate for a non-smoking 21-year-old. Observations are at the plan-county level.
Possible Explanations
We now describe potential explanations for insurers' decision to selectively offer plans within a rating area.
Risk Screening. The first potential explanation is that insurers target counties with different plans to better risk screen consumers. This is what we label as the risk screening hypothesis. If counties within a rating area have heterogeneous risk distributions, then offering a single plan may not maximize an insurer's profit because the ACA rules mandate that premiums be the same for all counties of a rating area. Instead, insurers could target counties of different risk distributions with different plans. In the extreme case, an insurer could offer a county-specific plan for every county in a rating area. In this case, the marketing breadth measures based on plan coverage would be smaller than those based on insurer coverage. This is because while insurers enter all counties within a rating area, plans are very selectively offered to counties. Figure 4 plots the RA-level marketing breadth based on insurer coverage, B I 3 (r), against that based on plan coverage, B P 3 (r), along with a 45-degree line. The figure shows that it is common to observe rating areas where the marketing breadth measure based on plan coverage is substantially smaller than the marketing breadth measure based on insurer coverage. Furthermore, Tables 13 and 14 suggest that (1) insurers tend to avoid counties of smaller population and higher risk, and (2) when they do enter these counties, they are likely to offer less comprehensive plans. As not offering any plans is an extreme form of price discrimination, and insurers typically target high risk consumers with less comprehensive plans, these statistics also support the risk screening hypothesis. (2) report average county characteristics of RAs where some plans are selectively offered. Unbracketed values are computed as follows: we first compute the mean value of a given county characteristic for each rating area, and then compute the mean of those averages among rating areas without any partial entry, reported in Column (1), and with some partial entry, reported in Column (2) . Bracketed values are computed as follows: we first compute the standard deviation of a given county characteristic for each rating area, and then compute the mean of those standard deviations among rating areas without any partial entry, reported in Column (1), and with some partial entry, reported in Column (2).
Market Segmentation.
A second potential reason for the partial rating area offering phenomenon is that insurers do not wish to engage in fierce premium competition against each other. If all insurers are active in all counties within a rating area, they will face competition in every county which will put downward pressure on premiums. Insurers can avoid competition by dividing up a rating area, with each serving a mutually exclusive subset of counties. We refer to this explanation as the market segmentation hypothesis. In the extreme case, insurers could be a monopoly in counties where they sell plans. In this case, the marketing breadth measure based on insurer coverage would be very small. Table 12 reports that on average, an insurer enters 85% of counties within a rating area. Such statistics suggest that market segmentation may be hard to achieve in equilibrium, as incentives to deviate and enter other counties may be too large.
Provider Network
Competitiveness. Yet another possible explanation for the partial rating area offering phenomenon is that insurers may not offer plans in counties where they have narrow provider networks. As reported in Figure 3 , there is a very strong positive relationship between plans' active status in a county and their provider network breadth in the county. It is worth noting at the outset that a plan's network breadth in a county may be endogenously determined by the plan's active status in the county. For example, an insurer may not contract with any health care providers in a county because he decides not to sell any plans in the county. However, in the data, we find that plans' average network breadth in counties where they are not offered is around 16%. If provider network formation is entirely determined by plan offering decisions, then given nontrivial costs of contracting with health care providers, plans' average network breadth in counties where they are not sold should be close to zero. We therefore suspect that at least some part of network formation is exogenous to plan offering decisions.
Model
In this section, we develop a model of insurer competition within a rating area to formalize our hypotheses and derive testable implications. In the model, insurers have an incentive to risk screen counties because counties differ in their risk distributions. They also have an incentive to avoid premium competition as it lowers their profit margins. The model incorporates the ACA provision that premiums of a given plan have to be identical in all counties where the plan is sold. To simplify the analysis, we examine two symmetric insurers' plan offering decisions in a rating area that consists of two counties. 
Model Description
Market Environment. Consider a rating area that consists of two counties indexed by c ∈ {A, B}.
The distribution of health expenditure θ in county c is given by CDF H c (θ) with its corresponding PDF h c (θ) . The willingness to pay for a type-θ consumer is given by v (θ) . We assume that v (θ) > θ. The population size of county c is given by λ c ∈ (0, 1) . Let
denote the CDF of health expenditures of all consumers in the rating area.
There are two insurance companies indexed by i ∈ {1, 2}. The two insurers are completely symmetric. 16 Let p c i denote the price of a health plan sold to county c by insurer i. Each insurer chooses a vector of prices, p i = (p A i , p B i ) ≥ 0, to maximize its profit given its competitor's vector of prices, p i = (p A i , p B i ). If insurer i's price in county c is infinite, i.e., p c i = +∞, it implies that insurer i is inactive in county c. On the other hand, a finite price, p c i < +∞, implies that insurer i is active in county c. If an insurer were to offer an identical plan to both county A and county B, the ACA regulation requires that the prices be the same, i.e., p A i = p B i .
There is a fixed cost, C, associated with offering a distinctive health plan. The total fixed cost (TFC) function is defined as
That is, if an insurer is active in only one county, his total fixed cost would be C; if an insurer offers an identical plan to both counties, his total fixed cost would also be C; but if an insurer offers two distinctive plans, say, by marketing the two plans under different names, then his total fixed cost would be 2C. (2018), we model the competition between the two insurers in a county as a form of modified Bertrand competition. Different from the standard Bertrand competition in which the insurer with the lowest price gets the entire market, we assume that consumers cannot compare prices perfectly. Instead, a consumer receives a noisy signal about which of the two insurers has a lower price. The consumer inspects the actual price of the insurer indicated by the noisy signal, and decides whether to buy from the insurer. The noisy signal creates spurious product differentiation and induces imperfect competition. 17
Imperfect Competition. Following Fang and Wu
Specifically, given the vector of prices posted by the two insurers in county c, (p c 1 , p c 2 ), the noisy signal, s, is determined by:
where ∼ N (0, σ 2 s ). It is clear that a consumer always follows the signal: if s = i, the consumer will find out the actual price p c i and decide between purchasing insurance at price p c i and staying uninsured. Hence, conditional on price vector (p c 1 , p c 2 ), the probability that a consumer considers purchasing from insurer i is Φ Game Between the Insurers. We denote an insurer's monopoly profit function in county c as Π c M (p) where p is the insurer's monopoly price. The monopoly profit function in county c is given by:
We assume that the fixed cost associated with offering a distinctive plan is less than the maximal monopoly profit from each county:
for c = A, B.
Insurer i's net profit as a function of its own price vector p i and its opponent's price vector p i is given by
where Φ p c i −p c i σs represents the probability that consumers in county c receive a noisy signal indicating that insurer i's has the lower premium. So insurer i's net profit function is the sum of any profits from county A and county B minus the total fixed costs. Note that if insurer i is inactive in county c, then it is equivalent to charging an infinite price, which would result in zero profit from county c.
Equilibrium.
A strategy profile (p * 1 , p * 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium of the model described above if,
Despite the simplicity of the model, it cannot be analytically solved. We will present numerical results below.
Risk Screening vs. Market Segmentation.
Before we present numerical results, we first want to discuss how the model captures insurers' incentive to risk screen consumers based on counties' risk distributions H i (θ), and their incentive to avoid competition by segmenting the counties in the rating area. We first discuss the risk screening incentive. As the risk distributions of the two counties are allowed to differ, insurers may find it profitable to offer two separate plans, each tailored specifically for the risk distribution of the targeted county. Thus, if we observe insurers offering two separate plans in equilibrium, it suggests that insurers selectively offer plans to risk screen consumers. This risk screening incentive increases in the difference between the risk distributions of the two counties, while it decreases in the fixed costs of offering distinctive plans.
On the other hand, insurers may wish to avoid competition and coordinate such that each be a monopoly in one of the two counties. So if we observe insurers each being a monopoly in equilibrium, it suggests that insurers selectively offer plans to avoid premium competition. This market segmentation incentive increases in the accuracy of the price signal, i.e., the inverse of σ s . This is because when the price signal is accurate, insurers have to engage in fierce premium competition in counties where they are both present. To avoid such competition, they may wish to give up one county entirely, and earn the maximal monopoly profit from the other county.
Parameterization
To numerically solve the model, we make several parametric assumptions. We parameterize the health expenditure distribution in county c as a log-normal distribution with location parameter µ c and scale parameter σ c . We parameterize type-θ's willingness to pay for a health plan as v(θ) = (1 + ρ)θ where ρ can be interpreted as the degree of risk aversion. The parameters of the model are therefore (C, σ s , ρ) , and (µ c , σ c , λ c ) for c = A, B.
We compute the equilibrium of the model for various values of (C, σ B , σ s ), while fixing the values of the remaining parameters. We focus on how the equilibrium of the model changes with respect to these three parameters for the following reasons. The fixed cost, C, is of interest because it affects insurers' incentive to offer county-specific plans. The scale parameter of the health expenditure distribution in county B, σ B , is of interest because, given that we fix σ A , it determines the risk heterogeneity between the two counties. The standard deviation of the pricing signal, σ s , is of interest because it determines the degree of premium competition between the two insurers. We fix the values of the remaining parameters as follows. The risk aversion parameter, ρ, is set to 1; the health expenditure parameters of county A, µ A and σ A , are set such that the mean monthly health expenditure is $550, and the standard deviation is one fourth of its mean; µ B is identical to µ A ; county B is of higher risk compared to county A with σ B ≥ σ A ; and finally, both counties are of equal size with λ A = λ B = 0.5.
Equilibrium Analysis
Before we present results from our equilibrium analysis, it is useful to categorize an insurer's pricing decision, p i = (p A i , p B i ), into four groups: (1) charge different and finite prices to county A and county B (two separate plans, one for each county); (2) charge the same finite price to both county A and county B (RA plan, offered to all counties); (3) charge a finite price to county A only (A only plan); and (4) charge a finite price to county B only (B only plan). The reason why we categorize insurers' pricing decisions in this manner is because it would be easier to present equilibria of the game in terms of the resulting market structures, rather than in terms of equilibrium prices.
Depending on insurers' pricing decisions, various market structures could be observed in equilibrium, from duopoly in every county to monopoly in every county. Furthermore, if a specific market structure is observed in equilibrium, then the corresponding equilibrium premiums satisfy inequality (14) when each insurer's choice set is restricted to prices that yield the specific market structure. For example, if we observe insurer 1 offering an A-only plan and insurer 2 offering a B-only plan in equilibrium, then insurer 1's equilibrium pricing strategy is p 1 = (p A * M , +∞), and insurer 2's equilibrium pricing strategy is p 2 = (+∞, p B * M ) where p c * M is the optimal monopoly premium in county c as defined in Equation (12) .
We now present market structures observed in equilibrium as functions of the key parameters, (C, σ B , σ s ) . The results are reported in Figure 5 . Each panel uses a constant value of C and indicates the equilibrium market structures in the (σ B , σ s )-space. Values of σ B range from σ A to 2σ A . Values of σ s range from 27.5 to 550, which represent 5% and 100% of the mean health expenditure in county A, respectively. We set values of C such that for all values of (σ B , σ s ), the duopoly profit in county B is higher than C.
The key implications from Figure 5 are the following. First, only two market structures are observed in equilibrium (excluding the case of σ B = σ A ): pooling to an RA plan or pooling to two separate plans. This suggests that in equilibrium, insurers' plan offering decisions are positively correlated. Second, pooling to an RA plan is more likely when the fixed costs are large, the risk heterogeneity is small, and consumers receive rather inaccurate information about prices. When insurers pool to offering RA plans, there is no partial rating area offering, and all plans are offered in all counties within a rating area. According to Table 11 , about 37% of the rating areas in our sample have all insurers pooling to RA plans. Third, pooling to offering two separate plans, i.e., engaging in risk screening, is more likely when the fixed costs are small, the risk heterogeneity is large, and consumers are very price sensitive. When both insurers offer county-specific plans, then the rating area's plan marketing breadth, B P 3 (r), would be 0.5 while its insurer marketing breadth, B I 3 (r), would be higher at 1. Figure 4 shows that in our data, it is quite common to observe rating areas where B I 3 (r) is much higher than B P 3 (r). 18 Lastly, market segmentation is hard to achieve in equilibrium. For all parameter values considered in the figure, we cannot observe (A only plan, B only plan) as an equilibrium market structure. This is because in our model, the incentive to deviate from (A only plan, B only plan) and enter the other county is too large. 19 To sum, the model supports the risk screening hypothesis, rather than the market segmentation hypothesis. A testable implication that we obtain from the model is that in equilibrium, insurers' plan offering decisions would be positively correlated rather than negatively correlated.
Limitations of the Model
We discuss two main limitations of the model. First, the model assumes that insurers play an one-shot game in a single rating area. These assumptions limit insurers' ability to penalize the opponent's deviation from a market segmentation agreement, making it harder to sustain market 18 While there are many rating areas with B P 3 (r) > B I 3 (r), for these rating areas, the difference |B P 3 (r) − B I 3 (r)| is small. On the other hand, for rating areas with B P 3 (r) < B I 3 (r), the difference is fairly large. 19 For example, suppose insurer 1 is a monopoly in county A and insurer 2 is a monopoly in county B. In this case, insurer 1 cannot do worse by expanding the plan coverage, and turning its A-only plan into an RA plan. This, of course, may not be the case if insurer 1 had to incur extra fixed costs from expanding the plan's marketing breadth. segmentation as an equilibrium outcome. For example, the folk theorem logic suggests that market segmentation is easier to sustain if insurers compete over an infinite horizon. Competition in multiple rating areas can additionally make it easier to sustain market segmentation as an equilibrium outcome. This is because insurers can punish opponents' deviation from the agreement in one rating area by threatening to end the agreement in another rating area. We do not consider such cases for tractability. Regardless of how market segmentation is sustained in equilibrium, the model implies that under market segmentation, there will be a negative correlation in entry patterns across insurers within a rating area. This is the key empirical implication that we test in the next section.
Another limitation of the model is the assumption that insurers are completely symmetric. In reality, insurers are differentiated by their non-price measures such as provider networks. As illustrated in Figure 3 , provider network breadth could be an important factor in insurers' plan offering decisions. In the empirical analysis that follows, we investigate how insurers' entry decisions are correlated with provider network breadth conditional on other various dimensions of heterogeneity.
Empirical Results
In this section, we test implications of the model, and provide empirical explanations for the partial rating area offering phenomenon. As suggested by the equilibrium analysis of the static model in Section 4, partial rating area offering is likely to emerge in equilibrium as a result of risk screening rather than market segmentation. But as mentioned above, market segmentation could also emerge as an equilibrium outcome if we had incorporated infinite horizon and/or multiple rating area competition. Below, we examine the testable implications under the risk screening hypothesis and the market segmentation hypothesis: Testable Hypothesis. Under the risk screening hypothesis, insurers' plan offering decisions would be positively correlated across counties in a rating area; under the market segmentation hypothesis, they would be negatively correlated.
Correlation Construction
Using the notations introduced in Section 3, we construct a nonparametric measure of correlations between insurers' entry decisions across different counties in a rating area. Recall that the set of plans offered by insurer i is denoted by P I (i), and the set of plans offered in rating area r is denoted by P R (r). Then, for each insurer i who is active in rating area r, i.e., i ∈ I R (r), we can define the set of plans insurer i offers in rating area r as
For each insurer i ∈ I R (r), and for each county c ∈ C(r), define an indicator O (i, c) as follows: 
In words, CORR(r) measures the average alignment of insurers' entry decisions across counties in a given rating area. We say that the insurers' plan offering decisions are positively (negatively) correlated in rating area r if CORR(r) > 0 (< 0).
Illustrative Examples.
To better describe how our correlation measure works, we use the model presented in Section 4 as an example. If each insurer offered two separate plans, one for each county, then CORR I (r) would be 1. On the other hand, if insurer 1 offered an A only plan while insurer 2 offered a B only plan, then CORR I (r) would be −1. So the correlation measure captures the idea that insurers' plan offering decisions are positively correlated under the risk screening hypothesis, while they are negatively correlated under the market segmentation hypothesis. We present more illustrative examples in Appendix A.
Empirical Correlations
We first compute correlation measure CORR(r) for rating areas in our final Marketplace PUF, reported in Table 3 . We exclude rating areas where there is a single insurer, because our correlation Rating areas with some partial entry (B Notes: The sample is restricted to rating areas with at least two counties and two participating insurers. Using rating areas with some partial entry, the table reports descriptive statistics of the correlation measure CORR I (r) defined in Equation (18). For rating areas with no partial entry, the correlation measure is one by construction. For each rating area with some partial entry, we compute its weight as the denominator in Equation (18) divided by the sum of this value for all rating areas with some partial entry. These weights are used to compute the mean using nonequal weights. measure can only be computed for rating areas with at least two insurers. This restriction reduces our sample size from 259 rating areas to 247 rating areas. 20 Table 16 reports summary statistics of the correlation measure. Out of 247 rating areas, 135 rating areas (about 55%) have at least one insurer who selectively enters counties. Our focus is on these rating areas as we are interested in explaining the partial offering decisions. Of these 135 rating areas, 121 have strictly positive correlations, while only 12 rating areas have strictly negative correlations. The mean correlation ranges from 0.34 to 0.37, depending on the weights that we assign to each rating area (see the table for details). Figure 6 reports the the correlation histogram for the 135 rating areas with partial entry. It has a very thin left tail as rating areas with negative correlations are very rare.
Test Construction
The correlation measure CORR(r) can be computed for each rating area with at least two insurers and two counties. We assume all rating area observations are independent, implying that correlation measures {CORR(r)} r=R r=1 are also independent, where R is the total number of rating areas with at least two insurers and two counties. Define CORR = R=1 r=1 CORR(r) , which is the sum of all correlation measures. Then mean and variance of CORR are given as: (18). The sample is restricted to rating areas that have at least two counties and two participating insurers, where there is some partial entry.
By Lindeberg-Lyapunov conditions, we have
as R −→ ∞.
For a given rating area r, we now derive E[CORR (r) ] under a null hypothesis of independent county entry decisions across insurers (the exact hypothesis will be stated shortly). Each insurer in the rating area decides which counties to enter with the constraint that it has to enter at least one county. 21 Let a i ∈ A(r) denote insurer i's choice, which is a vector of counties (or a county) that it chooses to enter. The choice set A(r) has all possible combinations of counties that each insurer can enter. The number of elements in A(r) is
The null hypothesis that we use is the following:
Null hypothesis. County entry decisions are independent across insurers, and each insurer's county entry decision is random, i.e., each insurer chooses an element in the set A(r) with probability 1 |A(r)| .
So if the realized value of CORR is large enough, then we reject the null in favor of the risk screening hypothesis. On the other hand, if the realized value of CORR is small enough, then we reject the null in favor of the market segmentation hypothesis. Proof: First, assume |C(r)|=2, i.e., there are just two counties in the rating area r. The choice set for each insurer is ((c, c ) , (c, c ) )}, which happens with probability 3 × 1 (c , c) }, which happens with probability 2 × 1 3 · 1 3 = 2 9 . So E[o(i, i ; c, c )] = 3 9 − 2 9 = 1 9 = 1 |A(r)| 2 , since |A(r)| = 3. Next, assume |C(r)| ≥ 3. In a given pair of counties (c, c ), let d i ∈ {0, 1} × {0, 1} denote insurer i's entry statuses in the two counties. So we have d i ∈ {(1, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1), (0, 0)}. As each insurer randomizes over the choice set under the null, we have
Note that 2 |C(r)|−2 represents the number of possible entry statuses in counties other than c and c . For d i = (0, 0), we have to rule out the case where insurer i doesn't enter any of the remaining counties (remember that each insurer is active in at least one county). Using the null assumption that insurers act independently, we have P r [(O(i, c) 
The first term represents the probability of observing exactly the same entry statuses of the two insurers excluding the case of no entry in the two counties, i.e., d i = d i = (0, 0). The second term represents the probability of d i = d i = (0, 0). On the other hand, we have o(i, i ; c, c ) = −1 with probability
The first term represents the probability of observing (d i , d i ) = ((1, 0) , (0, 1)) or (d i , d i ) = ((0 , 1), (1, 0) ), and the second term represents the probability of observing (d i , d i ) = ((0, 0) , (1, 1)) or (d i , d i ) = ((1, 1) , (0, 0) ). The expected value of o (i, i ; c, c ) is
So under the null, we have
which implies that for any given rating area r, E[CORR (r) ] depends only the number of counties in the rating area.
Proposition 2. Under the null, for a given rating area r, Var[ CORR(r) ] depends only on the number of counties and the number of insurers in the rating area r.
Proof: TBC. (r) ], we compute the sample variance using rating areas with the same number of counties and the same number of insurers. Note that we exclude rating areas for which we cannot compute sample variance; these are rating areas that have a unique combination of the number of counties |C(r)| and the number of insurers I R (r) . Column (1) uses rating areas that have at least two insurers and two counties, and for which we can compute the sample variance. Column (2) further restricts the sample to rating areas where there is partial entry by at least one insurer. We can reject the null of independence in favor of the risk screening hypothesis at a very small significance level.
Test Results
The empirical findings found in this section agree with the model's implication that insurers' plan offering decisions would be positively correlated in equilibrium. So from the 2016 marketplace data, we find strong empirical support for (against) the risk screening (market segmentation) hypothesis. Table 13 , which shows that counties with poorer heath measures are more likely to be excluded by insurers, provides further support for the risk screening hypothesis.
In Appendix B, we apply the correlation test to the 2017 Marketplace PUF. While positive correlations are still much more likely to be observed than negative correlations, their share has fallen Notes: Column (1) uses rating areas that have at least two insurers and two counties, and for which we can compute the sample variance. Column (2) further restricts the sample to rating areas where there is partial entry by at least one insurer.
from 90% in 2016 to 62%. We again reject the null of independence in favor of the risk screening hypothesis but the test statistic takes a lower value. This result implies that while the risk screening incentive was the dominant factor in insurers' county entry decisions in the marketplaces, the market segmentation incentive is becoming stronger.
Discussion: Connections with Affiliation Tests
Here we discuss and contrast our correlation measure with some recent nonparametric tests of affiliation in the auction literature. The notion of affiliation is stronger than positive correlation, and it was first introduced into economics by Milgrom and Weber (1982) in auction settings. 22 Affiliation of bidders' signals has testable implications for observable decision variables, such as bids and participation decisions. Since then, various tests have been developed to test affiliation in the context of auctions (Roosen and Hennessy, 2004; de Castro and Paarsch, 2010; Jun et al., 2010; Aradillas-Lopez, 2016) . In particular, Aradillas-Lopez (2016) developed a non-parametric test for affiliation of bidders' participation decisions based on the aggregate number of bidders. 23 Aradillas-Lopez (2016)'s test is based on the result that in competitive auctions where bidders' values are affiliated, bidders' participation decisions would also be affiliated. This implies that, under the null hypothesis of affiliation, the aggregate number of bidders in auctions must satisfy some inequality. If the test rejects the null hypothesis of affiliation, it could suggest that bidders are not acting competitively, such as acting in collusion. Indeed, Aradillas-Lopez et al. (2017) use this implication as the basis for testing whether there is evidence for collusion in off-shore oil and gas lease auctions.
One of the main hypotheses that we test in this paper is whether parting rating area offering can be explained by insurers' incentive to segment a rating area and avoid competition. As market segmentation could also be sustained as a result of collusion among insurers, it could be tempting to apply Aradillas-Lopez (2016) 's test of affiliation to our setting. A county will correspond to an auction, and insurers' entry decisions in different counties in the same rating area would correspond to bidders' participation decisions in auctions. Aradillas-Lopez (2016) 's test of affiliation is based on the number of bidders in auctions. Applied to our setting, we would use the number of entering insurers in a county as the analog of the number of bidders in an auction. Using multiple observations of counties, we would compute the Aradillas-Lopez (2016)'s test statistic, and decide whether to reject the null of affiliation among insurers' entry decisions in a county. Finding evidence for the null of affiliation would be supportive of the risk screening hypothesis while finding evidence against the null would be supportive of the market segmentation hypothesis.
However, one key assumption needed to properly implement the Aradillas-Lopez (2016)'s test is that bidders' participation decisions are i.i.d. across auctions. Applied to our setting, this assumption would imply that insurers' county entry decisions are i.i.d. across all counties. However, insurers' county entry decisions within a rating area are unlikely to be independent. As in our model, it is reasonable to assume that insurers in a given rating area decide simultaneously which counties to enter with the constraint that premiums of the same plan have to be identical for all counties within the rating area. In this case, insurers' entry decisions in counties that belong to the same rating area would not be independent, and the Aradillas-Lopez (2016) test would not be applicable. Our correlation measure is an intuitive statistic that summarizes how aligned insurers' decisions are across counties within a rating area. As the main testable implication of the model is about correlations among insurers' entry decisions across counties, our measure is better suited to empirically examine this implication.
Regression Analysis
The correlation analysis described earlier is informative about how insurers' equilibrium decisions are related within a rating area. However, this correlation analysis does not take into account heterogeneity in provider networks, plan features, and county characteristics, which could have a substantial role in insurers' decisions. In particular, provider networks could be a very important factor for insurers' plan offering decisions, as suggested in Figure 3 . To analyze how insurers' plan offering decisions are related to provider networks conditional on other dimensions of heterogeneity, we estimate the following regression:
where subscript p is for plans, i is for insurers, c is for counties, and r is for rating areas. The dependent variable, O (p, c) , is defined in (1), which takes value 1 if plan p is offered in county c, and 0 otherwise. We construct O (p, c) for each plan and for each county that belongs to a rating area where the plan is offered, i.e., sold in at least one of its counties. P LAN p is a vector of plan characteristics, and COU N T Y c is a vector of county characteristics. To control for insurer heterogeneity, we include insurer fixed effects, denoted by τ i . As one can see from the construction of the dependent variable, we are interested in understanding how various factors are related to insurers' county entry decisions within a rating area. However, as we pool observations from multiple rating areas, heterogeneity across rating areas becomes problematic. To resolve this issue, we add rating area fixed effects, denoted by η r . Finally, N ET W ORK p,i,c,r is a vector of network breadth measures, which are the key explanatory variables. It is defined as:
where OW N p,i,c,r is plan p's network breadth in county c, and OW N p,i,r is plan p's average network breadth in rating area r. COM P i,c,r is insurer i's competitors' average network breadth in county c, and COM P i,r is insurer i's competitors' average network breadth in rating area r. The reason for deducting rating area means from both elements can be best illustrated by the following example. Consider a rating area with three counties. Suppose plan p's network breadth in the three counties is 100%, 100%, and 50%, respectively. In this case, plan p's network breadth in the third county, which is 50%, is relatively small. Now consider another plan p whose network breadth in the same three counties is 50%, 50%, and 0%, respectively. For this plan, network breadth of 50% is relatively large. To account for such level differences across plans, we adjust each plan's network breadth in a county by their respective average value in the rating area. 24 Table 18 reports the summary statistics of the controls used in regression (24) .
Column (1) of Table 19 reports the estimated coefficients, where standard errors are assumed to independent across all observations. The coefficient estimates indicate that there is a positive and statistically significant correlation between plans' own network breadth and offer probabilities, while there is a negative and statistically significant correlation between competing plans' network breadth and offer probabilities. For economic significance, plans' own network breadth is much (1) (2) N ET W ORK p,c Own network breadth * (%) 0.0045 * * * 0.0045 * * * (0.0001) (0.0001) Competitors' average network breadth * (%) −0.0008 * * * −0.0008 * * * (0.0001) ( Access to healthy foods (0 is worst, 10 is best) 0.0037 * * 0.0037 * * (0.0012) (0.0012) Share of adults with no leisure-time physical activity (%) −0.0014 * * * −0.0014 * * * (0.0004) (0.0004) Nonelderly (less than 65 yrs) population (in millions) 0.2253 * * * 0.2162 * * * (0.0085) (0.0086) Share of the nonelderly below 400% FPL (%) −0.0011 * * * −0.0010 * * * (0.0002) (0.0002) Urban share (%) 0.0004 * * * 0.0004 * * * (0.0000) (0.0000) College share (%) 0.0006 * * * 0.0006 * * * (0.0002) (0.0002) Unemployment rate (%) −0.0002 −0.0001 (0.0007) (0.0007) Competing plans in the county * 0.0007 * * * (0.0002) * * * p < 0.001, * * p < 0.01, * p < 0.05 EPO (Exclusive Provider Organization) . Controls with superscript * are mean-adjusted as follows.
(1) "Own network breadth" is defined as the the plan's network breadth in the county minus the plan's average network breadth across counties in the rating area,
"Competitors' average network breadth" is defined as the network breadth of competing plans in the county minus the average network breadth of competing plans across counties within the rating area, and (3) "Competing plans in the county" is defined as the number of competing plans in the county minus the average number of competing plans across counties within the rating area. more important than competing plans' network breadth; one standard deviation of a plan's own network breadth is associated with 15 percentage point increase in the offer probability, while one standard deviation of competing plans' average network breadth is associated with only 2 percentage point decrease.
To examine the correlation among insurers' plan offering decisions at the county level conditional on various dimensions of heterogeneity, Column (2) of Table 19 estimates Equation (24) with an extra explanatory variable, which is the number of competing plans in the county. 25 Note that the estimated coefficient for the (demeaned) number of competing plans in the county is positive and statistically significant. This result is consistent with our findings from the correlation analysis, reported in Table 16 , if variables in COU N T Y c do not perfectly control for risk heterogeneity across counties. In such cases, conditional on COU N T Y c , insurers would offer county-specific plans to account for risk heterogeneity that is not captured in COU N T Y c . The positive coefficient estimate for the (demeaned) number of competing plans in a county implies that there is a positive correlation among insurers' plan offering decisions, which provides further evidence for the risk screening hypothesis.
Conclusion
This paper documents how prevalently insurers in the ACA marketplaces sell plans that partially cover a rating area, and examines the primary motives behind the decision to offer such plans. Using individual health insurance plans sold in the federally-facilitated marketplaces, we find that about a third of the plans are sold to some, but not all, counties of a rating area. We use a simple model of insurer competition to derive a testable implication that (1) if insurers selectively entered counties to risk screen consumers, then their county entry decisions would be positively correlated, and (2) if they selectively entered counties to segment a rating area and avoid competition, their county entry decisions would be negatively correlated. We find empirical support for the risk screening hypothesis using both non-parametric correlation test and regression analysis.
Our findings have important implications for possible reforms on the ACA. First, rating area regulation only delivers an imperfect government control over insurers' ability to vary premiums by geographic region. Insurers in the marketplaces are effectively varying premiums by county, as they can endogenously determine plans' service area within a rating area. Second, while a direct regulation on plans' service area would implement "real" community rating, it could have perverse effects such as triggering insurer exits. This is because we find that risk screening is an important factor that insurers consider in determining plans' service area. If there is, for example, a new regulation mandating plans be offered in all counties of a rating area, including very high-risk counties, then insurers may exit the rating area altogether. Alternative policies could be considered such as providing subsidies tied to the risk score of counties. The ACA currently has a risk adjustment program which transfers funds from plans with lower risk enrollees to plans with higher risk enrollees. Our finding suggests that the program is not perfectly effective in eliminating insurers' risk screening motive. Lastly, to the extent that insurers are less likely to offer plans in counties where they have a narrower provider network relative to competitors, policymakers should consider regulations that reduce the disparity between network breadths of different insurers. Such a regulation would be similar in spirit to "most favored nation" in international trade: in counties with sparse plan participation, a health care provider that agrees to be in one insurer's network should also agree to be in networks of other insurers who wish to offer plans in the county.
While we document the prevalence of the partial rating area offering phenomenon and provide evidence for risk screening as the main mechanism, we do not know the effect of this phenomenon on consumer welfare. This is an important avenue for future research. 
